Abstract: Hegel argues that Kant'sa ntinomies of pure reason are important because they implicitlys how the categorieso ft hought to be contradictory.I ns o doing Hegeld isregardsm uch of what interests Kant about the antinomies and interprets the latter "against Kant'si ntention".H ea lso gets Kant wrongw hen he claims thatK ant's "trivial" resolution of the antinomies simplyshifts contradiction from thingsi nt hemselvest oa ppearances. Nonetheless, Ic ontend that Hegel'si nterpretation is defensible, insofar as the antinomies do, indeed, show (what Hegel regards as) the categories of the "infinite" and the "finite" to be both opposed to and inseparablef rom one another.Ialsoa rgue that Hegel is right to maintain that Kant'sp roofs of the theses and antitheses in the antinomies assume what they are meant to provea nd that Kant'sr esolution of the antinomies is unsatisfactory.
1H egel on Kant'sA ntinomies
Hegel is profoundlyc ritical of Kant'sa ccount of the antinomies of pure reason and especiallyo fw hat he regards as Kant's "trivial" resolution of them (EL §48 Remark) . Yeta tt he same time Hegel emphasises the considerable significance of Kant'saccount. "These Kantian antinomies",hewrites, "will always remain an important part of the critical philosophy",s ince "they,m ore than anything else, brought about the downfallo fp revious metaphysics and can be regarded as am ain transition into more recent philosophy" (in particular that of Hegelh imself) ( SL 190 / LS 198) .¹ How then,a ccordingt oH egel, did the antinomieshelp takeu sfrom pre-Kantian metaphysics to his own speculative philosophy?
Such metaphysics (exemplified most clearlyb yt he thought of Christian Wolff)s ought,i nH egel'sv iew,t oa ttribute predicates to objects of reason, such as the soul, the world and God, and it assumed in so doing that such predicates werem utuallye xclusive.I ta imed to determine, therefore, whether the world is finite or infinite and whether the soul is simple or composite, and it did not consider the possibility that the object concerned could in fact be being.⁴ Kant'santinomies thus do not lead directlytospeculative philosophy. By suggesting thatt he categoriesa re contradictory,t he antinomies challenget he idea thatt hey are simply distinct from, or opposed to,o ne another,t hatt hey are one-sided, finite categories; indeed, Hegel claims, the antinomies "produce the conviction of the nullity [Nichtigkeit] o ft he categorieso ff initude" (SL 190 / LS 198) . This does not,h owever,i tself requireu st os uspend all assumptions about the categories; yetitdoes help to prompt the philosopher,who is otherwise committed to free self-critical thought,todetermine from scratch, without presuppositions, how the categories are to be understood. The antinomies, as Hegel conceivesthem, thus do not themselvesmake presuppositionless philosophyn ecessary,b ut they contributei ndirectlyt ot he emergence of such philosophy.⁵ Hegel concedes that, for Kant,c ategorieso r" thought-determinations" are not contradictory in themselves, but contradictions arise onlyw hen reason applies themi nj udgementst ot he "unconditioned" or "thingsi nt hemselves" (or,m ore precisely, to the world considered as something "in itself").⁶ (Like the metaphysicians he criticises, Kant continues to think of categories themselvesa so ne-sided and finite.)⁷ Nonetheless,H egel contends, Kant'sa ccount of the antinomies implicitly suggests thatc ategories are contradictory,a nd that they are such necessarily: the "general idea" underlying that account,H egel writes,i st hat of the "necessity of the contradiction which belongst ot he nature of thought determinations" (SL 56 / LS 41) .⁸ Indeed, he calls this idea "the great negative step towards the true concept of reason" (SL 46 / LS 29) .⁹ This step is merelynegative,for Hegel, because it negates the simple distinctions and oppositions between categories and pointstotheir contradictory character,but does no more thanthis: it does not take us on to what Hegelthinks is the logical conclusion of that very step, namely the insight that opposed categories actuallyform a unity. Thisinsight is, however,reached in the course of speculative philosophy, initiallyand in particularinspeculative logic.S uch logic begins from the presuppositionless, indeterminate thought of pure being;b ut  See Houlgate( ,  -).  ForHegel'suse of the term "presuppositionless",orrather "presuppositionlessness" (Voraussetzungslosigkeit), see EL § Remark.  See EL § § Remark,  Remark; SL  / LS .Gueroult (,  -)appears to miss the fact that Hegels aw this.  See SL  / LS ; EL §.S ee also Düsing( , ), and Sedgwick (, ).  See also Gueroult (, ).  Throughout this essayIhave replacedM iller's "Notion" with "concept" as the translation of "Begriff".
categories then emerge that are more or less explicitlycontradictory or "antinomial",insofar as each is bothitself and its negation, and in this waythe insight that for Hegeli si mplicit in Kant'sa ntinomies is confirmed. We alsod iscover, however,t hat categories are not merelyc ontradictory,b ut provet ob em ore or less explicit unities of opposed determinations (see EL § §81-2).I nt he sphere of quality,for example, the infinite proves not justtobeacontradictory finite-infinite, but to be the perfect fusion of finitude and true infinity:t he trulyi nfinite process of its finite moments (see .¹⁰ Speculative logic does not stop at contradiction and antinomy, therefore, but shows how categories resolve the very contradictions they contain (bym utating either into further versions of themselveso ri nto different categories). Now,i nH egel'sv iew,K ant also "resolves" his antinomies to his owns atisfaction. He does so, however,n ot by watchingt hem resolve themselvesi nto a unity of opposed determinations but by declaring them to be merely "subjective" (SL 191 / LS 200) .¹¹ ForH egel'sK ant,the contradictions revealed by the antinomies are genuine and necessary,but the world thatexhibitssuch contradictions is in truth not something that exists in itself: it is merelythe world of our subjective experience, thati s, "the world of appearance" (die erscheinende Welt)( EL §48 Remark, translation altered). Whatever there mayb ei ni tself is thus, for Kant,f reeo fc ontradiction, and the latter belongso nlyt ot he world that is there for us. To Hegel, however,t his "resolution" is inadequate,f or it leaves the antinomies themselves "unresolved" (unaufgelöst). In the eyes of Kantian reason, Hegel claims, the contradictions remain, even though the world they beset is declaredt ob es ubjective rather than objective (SL 191 / LS 200) .
Note thatt herei sa ctuallya ni nconsistency in the position Hegela ttributes to Kant: for Hegel'sK ant,contradictions arise onlybecause opposing categories "are applied by reason to things in themselves" (SL 56 / LS 41), thati s, to the world considered as thing in itself;y et they remain even when the world is revealed not to be at hing in itself but mere appearance.( As we will see below, Hegel also gets Kant wrong at this point,s ince Kant himself does not consider appearancest ob ec ontradictory.) YetH egel fails to notice the inconsistency, so it makesnodifferencetohis assessment of Kant's "resolution" of the antinomies. The latter,i nH egel'sv iew,i si nadequate because Kant argues that "the worldlycontent,whose determinations are caught in such ac ontradiction, cannot be something in itself,b ut onlya ppearance [Erscheinung]" (EL §48, translation altered), but he thereby leaveso ur own "subjective" reason and experience  See also Houlgate( ,  -).  See also EL § and Remark, and Düsing (, ).
entangled in contradiction and, Hegel would add, contradictory categories. In the Logic,bycontrast,H egel provides what he considers to be am ore profound resolution of the antinomies. He does so by showing that the categories that (in his view) underliethose antinomies are not merely contradictory after all, either for our reason or in being itself, but "have their truth onlyintheir sublatedness [Aufgehobensein] , onlyinthe unity of their concept" (SL 192/LS 200, translation altered) .
The idea that Hegel'ss peculative logic proceeds by "resolving contradictions" is, of course, asimplification of what actuallygoes on, which is more complex and subtle.¹² Nonetheless, it is true that being and nothing are at odds in becomingb ut united in Dasein and that the contradictions of finitude are resolvedi nt rue infinity.S oH egel'ss implified description of what occurs in speculative logic is not wrong. The principal differenceb etween Hegel and Hegel's Kant is thus, indeed, that the formerr esolvesc ontradictions in categories that the latter leavesu nresolved.
Afurther differencebetween them is that Hegel'sK ant fails to see, as Hegel does, thatall antinomies, properlyunderstood, are actuallygenerated by categories. Inoted abovethat Hegel'sKant,unlike Hegelhimself, does not consider categoriesassuch to be contradictory,but locates the sourceofcontradiction in the application of those categoriestothe world (regarded as athing in itself). Thisin turn means thathedoes not understand the categories themselvestobethe true sourceofantinomies, and so does not appreciate the real significanceofwhat he has disclosed. ForH egel'sK ant,a ntinomies are conflicts between metaphysical judgements about the world (in which categories are applied to an object of reason), but they are not conflicts between, and do not highlight the contradictory character of, one-sided categories as such. As Hegel puts it,therefore, "Kant did not takeupthe antinomyinthe concepts themselves, but in the already concrete form of cosmological determinations" (SL 191 / LS 199) .I nH egel'so wn view,by contrast,what is expressed and demonstrated by Kant'santinomies -albeit implicitly -is that "the categories on their own account [fürsich] are what produce the contradiction" (EL §48 Remark, translation altered).¹³ Thus, in order to study the antinomies of reason properly, we must focus directlyonthe categories, without Kant's( for Hegel) extraneous cosmological baggage.I nHegel'sw ords: in order to possess the antinomyi ni ts purity and to deal with it in its simple concept,the determinations of thoughtm ust not be takeni nt heir application to and entanglement in  Foradetailed studyofthe logic of being(from the category of beingtothat of true infinity), see Houlgate( ,  -) .  See also Gueroult (, ).
Hegel, Kant and the Antinomies of Pure Reason the general idea of the world, of space, time, matter,e tc.; this concrete material must be omittedf romc onsideration of these determinations which it is powerless to influence and which must be considered purelyo nt heir own account,s incet hey alone constitute the essencea nd ground of the antinomies. ( SL 191 / LS 199)¹⁴ This, of course, is what Hegel does in his "science of logic".That logic can thus be regarded as Hegel'sr evised and purified version of Kant'si mportant but deficient studyofthe antinomies of reason (just as it can alsoberegarded as ar evised and purified version of Kant'sq uestion-begging derivation, or "metaphysical deduction",o ft he categories).¹⁵ Since Hegel'sK ant fails to identify the categories as the sourceofthe antinomies of reason, he also fails to see thatt here are far more than justf our such antinomies. Indeed, he fails to see that "profounder insight into the antinomial, or more trulyi nto the dialecticaln atureo fr eason demonstrates any concept whatever"-that is, any pure concept or category -" to be au nity of opposed moments to which, therefore, the form of antinomial assertions could be given" (SL 191 / LS 199) .¹⁶ In this respect,Hegel claims, Kant lags behind ancient Greek scepticism, which "did not spare itself the pains of demonstrating this contradiction or antinomyinevery concept which confronted it in the sciences" (SL 191 / LS 199) . YetK ant'scontribution is still the more important one for speculative philosophy -indeed, is "one of the most important and profound advances of the philosophyo fm odern times" (EL §48) -because he argues not just that antinomies can be found (or generated) by thought contingently, but that they belong to reason of necessity. This Kantian insistencet hatt he production of antinomies -or "dialectic"-is "anecessaryactivity of reason" (SL 56 / LS 41,translation altered) is so important,i nH egel'sv iew,b ecause it in turn makes it necessary for post-Kantian philosophyt or econsider the wayt he understanding conceiveso ft he categories (though,a sInoted above, it does not itself make a strictlyp resuppositionless studyo ft he categories necessary). Thisi sn ot to denyt hatH egel'sp hilosophyowes ad ebt to Greek scepticism (and to Greek dialecticin, for example, Zeno and Plato); but,inHegel'seyes, it is indebted more profoundlytoKant'sphilosophy.¹⁷ ForHegel, Kant'semphasis on the necessityof the antinomies, and by implication on the necessarilycontradictory character of categories, makes it essentialthat we reconsider how the latter have traditionally been conceived; and his commitment to rational self-critique and freedom re-
quires such reconsideration to takenothing for granted about thought(or being) and to be radicallyp resuppositionless.¹⁸ Having said all this, it is hard to denyt hat Hegel'su nderstanding of Kant's antinomies is, from a Kantian point of view,idiosyncratic. By Hegel'sown admission, he sets to one side what principallyinterests Kant about them and focuses on ac laim thatK ant himself does not explicitlym ake, namelyt hat categories produce the antinomies and thereby provet ob ec ontradictory themselves; indeed, Hegel even says thats uch ac laim goes "against [gegen]K ant'si ntention" (VGP 356) .¹⁹ Moreover,what Hegel means by "category" does not coincide exactly with what Kant means. Kant understandsac ategory to be ap ure concept through which "the synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition" is thought (CPR B1 05) ; this is to be distinguished not onlyf rom an empirical concept, but alsofrom other pure concepts, includingconcepts of reflection and transcendental Ideas (see CPR B316 ff., 378ff.). By contrast,Hegel usesthe term "category" in ab road sense to refer to all pure conceptsa nd does not restrict anyo f them to mere representations of the unity of intuition: all categories, for him, are logical structures in theirown right that at the same time bringfundamental ways of being to mind.²⁰ By implicitly suggesting that categories are themselves contradictory,Hegel'sKant thus implicitly suggests to Hegel himself that contradiction belongs to being as such -as uggestion that,a sH egel well knows, Kant himself would emphaticallyr eject.²¹ Kantians can be forgiven, therefore, for thinking that Hegel does not provide an interpretation of Kant's antinomies at all, but simply reads into them what he is interested in finding there. There are, It hink, good grounds for claiming that Kant should have been interested in what interests Hegelabout the antinomies, since, as Ihaveargued elsewhere, Hegel'swhole philosophyi st he logical outcome of taking Kant's own project of rational self-criticism more seriouslythanKant did.²² Nonetheless,itseems clear that Hegel does not do justicet oK ant'sa ntinomies in aw ay that Kant himself  Other influences on Hegeli nclude, of course, Aristotle, Spinoza, Leibniz and Schelling, but they do not require philosophyt oa void presuppositions in the wayt hat Greek scepticism and Kant'sthoughtdo. Other influencespushingHegel towards presuppositionlessness include Descartes, Fichteand modernfreedom moreg enerallyinthe moral, political and religious spheres; see Houlgate( ,  -).  See also Llewelyn (, ).  Hegeldistinguishes between determinations of beingand of reflection, but thinks of both as categories;s ee SL  / LW ,a nd EL § Remark.  ForHegel, contradiction as such can also be expressed as the "law" that states "all things are in themselvesc ontradictory" (SL  / LW ,t rans. altered).  See Houlgate( ,  -), and Houlgate (,  -).
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would have recognised, and thatthe Kant whose antinomies Hegel finds so fruitful is, in the words of Martial Gueroult, an "hegelianised Kant".²³ Yett hingsa re in fact al ittle more complicated than this, for,a sIwill argue later,Hegel'sinterpretationofK ant'santinomies is by no means whollyunjustified. Furthermore, Hegel sheds important light on Kant'sa ctual arguments or "proofs" in the antinomies (as opposed to what Kant should be arguingo rs uggests merely implicitly).
In Hegel'sview,Kant implicitlyshows categories, such as "finite" and "infinite",t ob ec ontradictory by showing them to be bound to one another,e ven though they are opposed;and he shows them to be bound to one another by arguing that both must be predicatedo ft he same worldb yr eason. As we have seen, Hegel applauds this implication of Kant'sa rguments. At the samet ime, however,hedismisses Kant'smanner of argument itself as a "useless form" (unnütze Form) (SL 191 / LS 199) . Kant'sarguments or "proofs" are "useless",inHegel'sv iew,b ecause they serven or eal purpose, and they serven op urpose because they simplyp resuppose what they are meant to prove. ForH egel, Kant's arguments in the antinomies, which purport to provethat the world is both finite and infinite, are reallyn om ore than assertions masquerading as arguments:
the Kantian antinomies on closer inspection contain nothingm oret han the quites imple categorical assertion of each of the two opposed moments of ad etermination, each beingt akeno ni ts own in isolation from the other.B ut at the same time this simple categorical, or strictlyspeakingassertoric statement is wrapped up in afalse, twisted scaffolding of reasoning which is intended to produce asemblanceofproof and to conceal and disguise the merelya ssertoric character of the statement. ( SL 192/LS 200) The second antinomy, for example, consists merelyi nt he assertion of the two moments of quantity -discreteness and continuity -against one another: "the one-sided assertiono fd iscreteness givesi nfinite or absolute dividedness [Geteiltsein]",w hereas "the one-sided assertiono fc ontinuity,o nt he other hand, givesi nfinite divisibility [Teilbarkeit]" (SL 190 / LS 198) . The world is thus asserted to be absolutelyf inite in the first case, since division reaches its limit in simple discretep arts, and absolutelyi nfinitei nt he second case, since divisioncontinues without end.²⁴ (Hegel is well aware, by the way, thatK ant ac- Gueroult( , ).  See Gueroult (, ). Hegeldescribesboth dividedness and divisibility as "absolute" or "infinite",b ut he does so to emphasiset hat each moment is asserted "absolutely" by itself in abstraction fromt he other.H ek nows that for Kant the thesis of an antinomya sserts af inite, limited series,w hereas the antithesis asserts an infinite series;s ee VGP  -.S ee also CPR B  -,a nd Grier (, ).
tuallyo pposes "composition" (Zusammensetzung), rather than "continuity",t o simplicity and discreteness in the second antinomy, but he insists thatt his does not itself generate an antinomy, since it is at autologyt hat "the composite consists of the simple" (SL 192/LS 201) . On the other hand,Hegel maintains, by asserting in the proof of the antithesis that "composition is possible onlyi n space",which for both Kant and Hegel is continuous, Kant implicitly pits continuitya gainst simplicity in the antinomy ( SL 195 / LS 205) .)²⁵ Kant himself contends that the arguments in support of the thesis and antithesisi ne ach antinomya re "sophistical" (vernünftelnd), insofar as they rest on an illegitimate assumption. This assumption is that appearancesa re things in themselvesa nd so form aw orld thati si ndependent of us (but also givent o us) and that can be limited or unlimited, composed of indivisible units or endlesslyd ivisible, and so on 535) . YetK ant alsoi nsists that,a side from this assumption, the "proofso ft he fourfold antinomya re not semblances [Blendwerke]b ut well grounded" (CPR B5 35): they are properlyf ormeda rguments that are "without contradiction" and are supported by "valid and necessary grounds" (CPR B4 49) .²⁶ Indeed, in the Prolegomena Kant states unequivocallyt hat "Iw illv ouch for the correctness of all these proofs" (Prolegomena §52a ). Thus, on the (illegitimate)assumption that empirical objects form an independent world "in itself",t he arguments in each antinomys ucceed, in Kant's view,i nproving that both the thesis and the antithesis are true of that world. In Hegel'sv iew,b yc ontrast, such arguments are mere "pseudoproofs" (Scheinbeweise), quite apart from the assumption that Kant claims they make. This is because they presuppose the very thesis and antithesis that they are to prove( and the categoriesc ontained therein): "what is supposedt ob ep roved is always alreadyc ontained in the presuppositions that form the starting point,and the semblance of amediation is produced onlythrough Kant'sprolix, apagogic procedure" (EL §48 Add.) . This can be seen, for example, in Kant's proof of the thesis in the second antinomy. The thesis statest hat "every composite substance in the world consists of simple parts";b ut the proof depends on the claim that "with substances composition is onlyacontingent relation, apart from which,a sb eingsp ersisting by themselves, they must subsist",which is itself just ar estatement of the thesis (CPR B4 62 -4, emphasis added; see also . Indeed, as Michelle Grier puts it,K ant'sp roof actually "exploits ap urelyc onceptual necessity",n amely, thatt he very "concept of a composite"-and not just that of a "composites ubstance"-" commits us to  See also CPR B , .  See also Sedgwick( ,  -).
Hegel, Kanta nd the Antinomies of Pure Reason the concept of the simple, which externallyrelates to comprise it".²⁷ Grier fails to note, however,thatthis makes amockery of Kant'sclaim to have proven the thesis "apagogically".²⁸ Hegel'sc harge, therefore, is not (as Kant'si s) that the proofs of the thesis and antithesis in each antinomyr est on an unwarranted assumption about appearances,but rather thatthese proofs are altogethercircular.This problem cannot just be blamed on the proponents of the twopositions, for Kant himself sets out the proofs and, indeed, regards them as correct (givent he illegitimate assumption on which they rest). The problem, as Hegel sees it,i st hus, in Sally Sedgwick'sw ords, that "Kant's treatment of the antinomies is questionbegging".²⁹ This strikes me, as it strikes Sedgwick, as aserious and well founded charge.
2K ant on the Antinomies in general
If, however,w ea re properlyt oa ssess the merits of Hegel'si nterpretation of Kant'sa ntinomies, we need to look in more detail at Kant'so wn account of the latter.W ew ill thus now consider how in general, for Kant,a na ntinomyo r contradiction in reason is generated.
First,K ant argues, reason concludes -or,m orep recisely, leadst he understanding to judge³⁰ -that the totality of conditions of appearance, that is, the world,i sg iven as ar eality in itself. Thisc onclusion is reachedb yt he following argument that Kant regards as "dialectical":ifthe conditioned is given, then the whole series of all conditions for it is also given; now objectso ft he senses are givenasconditioned; consequently, the whole series of conditionsofthe objects of the senses is, and must be, givena saworld that is at hing in itself (CPR B525) .³¹ This argument is dialectical (in Kant'ssense)for two principal reasons. First,itassumeserroneously that objects of the senses can, indeed, be givenasa totality,whereas in fact,a s"appearances",they can be giveno nlyt hrough ar egressive synthesis that can never be completed. Second, it assumes, again erro- Grier (, ).  An "apagogical" proof of ap roposition is one that proceeds "throught he refutation of its opposite" (CPR B ), and the proofs of both the thesis and antithesis in an antinomyare supposed to take this form. neously,that the objects of the senses, as appearances,are also thingsi nthemselves( the assumption of transcendental realism).³² The conclusiont hat the world is givena sareality in itself is thus reached by ad ialectical argument that failst or espect the limits,i np articular to the concept of an "appearance", laid down by transcendental idealism.
After having convinced itself (or the understanding) that the totality of the conditions of appearances exists as aworld in itself, reason then discerns an ambiguity in the very idea of such atotality.Sowhat exactlyisthis ambiguity?The answer becomes clear if we consider the differencebetween the ideas of the soul and God and the idea of the world (see CPR B379). Each of the formeristhe idea of as ingle unconditioned condition: the unconditioned condition of thought as such in the case of the soul, and of all possibleobjects of thought,orofthingsas such, in the case of God (see CPR A397,B391).God, or the transcendental ideal, contains the totality of conditions of things, insofar as he, or it,e ncompasses "the entire storehouseo fm aterial from which all possible predicateso ft hings can be taken" (CPR B6 03) . Nonetheless, God is, or rather is assumed to be, the single "being of all beings" that grounds all things( CPR B6 07). The idea of the world, by contrast, is not that of as ingle unconditioned condition, but rather that of an explicit totality of conditions conceiveda saseries. More precisely, it is the thoughto ft he completes eries of conditions of appearances (see CPR B5 32).
Kant maintains that a "totality of conditions is always itself unconditioned" (CPR B3 79) . He also pointso ut,however,that the complete series of conditions of appearances can in fact be conceivedasunconditioned, or as entailing the unconditioned, in two distinct ways.Thisisanambiguity inherent in the idea of the world, but absent from the ideas of the soul and God. On the one hand,K ant contends, that series as aw hole can itself be considered to be unconditioned, "because outside it there are no more conditions regardingw hich it could be conditioned" (CPR B445n) . On the other hand, however,the series can be understood to have the unconditioned as its first member(for example, as the first part or the cause of the series) (see CPR B445). In the first case, in which thereisno unconditioned first member, the series will be infinite and "without limits";a ccordingly,r eason will never be able to completei ts regress through the conditions, even though the seriesi tself is givena sawhole. In the second case, by contrast,t he series will have an endpoint or limit and so be finite (see CPR B4 45 -6). That limit will be the limit of space and time,o rt he point at which  On transcendental realism,s ee CPR A ,G rier (, ), and Allison (, ).
Hegel, Kant and the Antinomies of Pure Reason divisionends,orthe unconditioned (free) cause of events, depending on the antinomyc oncerned.³³ Kant goes on to arguethat the completeseries of conditions of appearances not onlyc an but must be understood in these two opposing ways.W hen the thoughto ft his necessity is then combined with the assumption that the complete series actuallye xists as something in itself, the antinomies are generated. This is because thought must now attribute two mutuallye xclusive features to one reality,b ut that reality,a ss uch, must be determinate and so have one or the other of them (but not both). Note that,for Kant,agenuine antinomyorcontradiction is not produced by the mere thought that the world is, or must be, ambiguous in the wayIhave described. It arises onlywhen we take that ambiguous world to be a reality in itself that by its naturemust be unambiguous. Antinomies arise, therefore, onlyb ecause we combine conflictingj udgements about the "world" with the erroneous conclusion of the dialecticala rgument set out above, which is itself based on the error of transcendental realism. As Kant puts it, "if one regards the two propositions, 'Theworldisinfinite in magnitude', 'The world is finite in magnitude',ascontradictory opposites,then one assumes that the world (the whole series of appearances) is athing in itself" (CPR B532) .
Since the erroneous judgement that appearancesare thingsinthemselvesis, in Kant'sv iew,q uite "natural" (CPR B5 28), the antinomyt ow hich thatj udgement leads is itself "aw hollyn atural antithetic" (CPR B4 33) . The very fact that an antinomyo rc ontradiction arises, however,s hows that the judgement on which it rests is, indeed, erroneous: the antinomy "uncovers af alsehood lyingi nt his presupposition" of transcendental realism (CPR B5 35) . Thisi n turn, Kant maintains, provides an indirect proof of transcendental idealismthe thesis that "everything intuited in space or in time, hence all objects of an experience possible for us, are nothing but appearances, i. e., mere representations",n ot thingse xistingi ndependentlyi nt hemselves( CPR B5 18 -19;s ee also CPR B5 34). Kant'sd irect proof of such idealismi sp resented in the first part of the Critique,t he Transcendental Aesthetic, and it is against the background of this proof that he initiallyr ejects transcendental realism as an error:for the latter falselyturns appearances or mere representations into things in themselves. The fact that transcendental realism generates antinomies, however,confirms that it is an error,and so indirectlyconfirms the truth of transcendental idealism.³⁴ ForKant,reality as it is thought to be in itself cannot be contradictory or antinomial,but must be unambiguouslyi tself; indeed, "no predicatep ertains to a thing that contradicts it",whether the thing is athing in itself or an appearance (CPR B190 ). Yet, when the world -the completeseries of conditions of empirical objects -is judgedtobeareality in itself, it proves preciselytobecontradictory. Since the arguments provingi tt ob es oa re sound, givent he assumption that such aw orld exists, the conclusion we must draw is that thata ssumption must be wronga nd the world cannot be anything real in itself aftera ll. It must,r ather,b ea n" idea" thatm erely seems to have ar eal existenceo fi ts own. The fundamental forms of that world, namelys pace and time, cannot have ar eal existenceo ft heiro wn,e ither,b ut must be merelys ubjective (albeit for us universal): the ap riori forms of our human sensibility.I nt his way, transcendental idealism is proven indirectlybythe antinomygenerated by transcendental realism.³⁵ Kant,however,does not justify the claim that reality in itself cannot contain acontradiction; he takes it over,uncritically, from traditional formal logic.(It is, of course, immediatelyderived from the "principle of contradiction",which is regarded by Kant as the "general though to be sure onlyn egative condition of all our judgmentsw hatsoever" (CPR B1 90).)F or Kant,i ti ss imply obvious that no reality can be contradictory;wherecontradiction is found,therefore, there can be no reality. This, Itakei t, is whyH egel accuses Kant of showingt oo great a "tenderness" (Zärtlichkeit)t owardst hings( EL §48 Remark).³⁶ In Hegel'sv iew,K ant deserves (qualified) credit for maintaining that reason generates antinomies, but he deserves censuref or insisting,without clear justification, thatr eality as it is thoughtt ob e, and as it is judgeda ctuallyt ob e, in itself must be free of all contradiction.³⁷  On CPR B  the indirect proof of transcendental idealism is slightlydifferent.I tg oes like this: if the world is awhole in itself, it must be either finite or infinite; but both claims arefalse (as has been shown by the arguments in the antinomies); therefore, the claim that the world is a whole in itself is also false. On CPR B ,h owever,K ant argues that this latter claim is false, not because the thesis and antithesis aref alse, but because they constitute a "conflict" (Widerstreit). The thesis and antithesis arethen shown to be false, because the claim that the world is a whole in itself is false, not vice versa.  Sedgwick(, )finds Hegel'sremark "bewildering",but it is in my judgement perfectly intelligible, givenK ant'sc ommitment to the principle of contradiction.  ForH egel, such aj ustification would have to entail derivingt he principle of contradiction, without presuppositions, fromt he very natureo ft hought and being. In Hegel'so wn presuppositionless logic, however,h ed emonstrates that contradiction is actuallya ni ntegral featureo f beingi tself; see SL  - / LW  -.
As we have seen, there is anecessary tension in the very idea of acomplete series of conditions of appearances,since it can, and must,beconceivedbothas unconditioned itself (and so unlimited and infinite) and as containinganunconditioned first member(and so limited and finite). Astrict antinomyorcontradiction arises, however,o nlyw hen that completes eries is taken actuallyt ob e something real in itself, that is, when we commit the error of transcendental realism:f or onlyi nt hat case are we required to attribute twom utuallye xclusive characteristics to ar eality that must be one or the other.I f, therefore, we abandon the idea that this completes eries constitutes something real in itself, in favour of transcendental idealism, then the antinomies of pure reason are immediately "removed" (gehoben)( CPR B534): if the reality that proves contradictory is eliminated, then the contradiction it produces itself disappears.A ccordingly, for the critical or transcendental idealist,t here is "no real contradiction of reason" (CPR B7 68), because there is no determinatet otality of appearances,o r " world in itself",a bout which two mutuallye xclusive judgementsm ust be made:s uch aw orld is am ere "mirage" (Blendwerk)( CPR B4 51). The thesis and antithesis of each antinomyr emaino pposed to one another,b ut they are not actuallya bout anything and so produce no contradiction.³⁸ It is important to emphasise here that,inK ant'sview,not every pairofconflicting assertions about athing or thingsproduces acontradiction. If, for example, we assert that every bodysmells good and also that every bodysmells bad, there is not necessarilyacontradiction, since both propositions could be false: there could, after all, be bodies thatdonot smell at all (see CPR B531). Acontradiction in Kant'ss ense arises onlyw hen two assertions are madea bout something,a nd are assumed to be true of it,o ne of which, however,m ust be false while the other is true. So if we assert botht hat every bodys mells good and that not every bodys mells good (partlyb ecause some do not smell at all), we have ad irect contradiction, because one assertion must be true and thereby excludes the other.
 See also Sedgwick(, ) . Note that in all four antinomies of purereasonthe thesis and antithesisare both shown to be false insofar as their shared assumption, namelytranscendental realism, is shown to be false. There is, however,a lso ad ifferenceb etween the "mathematical" and "dynamical" antinomies. The theses and antitheses of the "mathematical" antinomies cannot be true at all, sincethe series of appearancesand their conditions can never form atotality, but is giveno nlyi naregressive "empiricals ynthesis" (CPR B ) . By contrast,the theses and antitheseso ft he dynamical antinomies could conceivablyb et rue, if transcendental realism werea bandoned, since they would then simplyc oncern thingsi nt hemselves( af ree cause and an ecessary being) that arep ossible but,whatever their status,b eyond our cognition. The thesis and antithesis in each case would still contradict one another,b ut either could be true. See CPR B  -,a nd also Wood (, ).
Similarly,conflictingclaims about the world as awhole produce acontradiction, when both provet obenecessary but one must be true and the other false. Take,f or example, the thesis and antithesis of the first antinomy( without their specific referencet ospacea nd time).The thesis statest hat the world is finite in magnitude, whereas the antithesis states thati ti si nfinite.They produce ac ontradiction, however,o nlyu nder the condition that "the world (the whole series of appearances) is athing in itself"-an actually existing thing in itself -and so must be "determined in itself regarding its magnitude":f or this condition requires that it have am agnitude thati se ither finite or infinite (but thatc annot be both) . If, therefore, we removet his condition by denying that the world exists as at hing in itself, the contradiction automaticallyd isappears. It does so, because the thesis and antithesis both provet ob ef alse: the world is neither finite nor infinite in itself,s ince therei sn ow orld "in itself" at all.³⁹ The conflict in each antinomyi st hus in truth not ac ontradiction but a "dialectical" conflict -one that merely seems to be ac ontradiction -because the world thati si ts subject is itself an illusion. As Kant writes,i ti ss imply "a conflict of an illusion" (or "duet o "an illusion) (ein Widerstreit eines Scheins) (CPR B5 34) .
Yetthingsare in fact more complicated than Kant recognizes:for the conflict that is generated by the illusory world cannot just be seemingly contradictory.A contradiction is initiallyproduced because the "world" is necessarilyambiguous but is also judgedtobesomething real in itself and thereforeunambiguous. This contradiction is then "removed" when the world is shown not to be real in itself after all, but to be merelyillusory.The world, however,retains the samecharacteristics when it is reduced to mere illusion, as it had when it wasj udgedt ob e real in itself: it must still be understood to be bothfinite and infinite, and to have ad eterminate character of its own thati su nambiguouslyf inite or infinite. This means that this illusory world must itself give rise to an actual contradiction. There is no contradiction in the world in itself, since therei sn os uch world and the thesis and antithesis of an antinomya re both false insofar as they are taken to apply to such aw orld. Yett herei ss tillac ontradiction in the world there seems to be, since the thesis and antithesis still applyn ecessarilyt ot hat world, but the latter cannot be characterised by both of them. When the world is exposed as an illusion, therefore, the conflict between the thesis and antithesis does not just provet ob eseemingly contradictory (and so dialectical); it remains a genuine contradiction besetting the world therem erely seems to be. Kant does not make this point explicit himself -indeed, he insists that "the con-
 See Allison (, ).
Hegel, Kant and the Antinomies of Pure Reason flict of reason with itself" can be brought "entirely to an end" (CPR B544) -but the point is implicit in what he says.
The judgements that the world has ab eginning in time and does not have such ab eginning thus have an ambiguous status. On the one hand, insofar as the world to which they apply is not something real in itself, those judgements merely seem to be true: they are illusory judgements. This in turn means that the transcendental illusion that Kant declares to be unavoidable includes not only the ideas and the principle Grier calls "P 2 "-namely, "when the conditioned is given, then so is the whole series of conditionss ubordinatedo ne to the other,which is itself unconditioned, alsogiven" (CPR B364)⁴⁰ -but also the theses and antitheseso ft he four antinomies: it includes "e. g. the illusion in the proposition 'the world must have ab eginning in time'" (CPR B3 53) . On the other hand, however,s uch judgementsd on ot merely seem to be true of the world that merely seems to be real, but they are indeed true of it.T he world as aw hole is not real in itself but merelys eems to be, but it remains no less true that it must be understood to be both finite and infinite even though it must alsob ed eterminate and so either finite or infinite.
Kant'sc laim that therei s" no real contradiction of reason with itself" (CPR B7 68) thus needs to be qualified. There is no actual contradiction, since no complete world to which mutuallyexclusive predicates necessarilya pplyi sa ctually given. Yett here is still a "real contradiction of reason",s ince such mutuallye xclusive predicatesc ontinue to applyt ot he determinate world that seems to be given. Thisc ontradiction is no mere illusion, but is an ecessary and irreducible feature of the world that seems, and must seem, to exist: it is the "conflictofan illusion" thatremains contradictory (CPR B534,translation altered). Kantian reason -that is, reason enlightened by transcendental idealism -does not confront ac ontradictory reality "in itself",but it willa lways face the contradictions generatedbythe illusions thatitnecessarilyprojects,that is, by its own "subjective" products. In this sense, Hegeli sr ight to claim that Kant'ss olution to the antinomies "make[s] the so-called conflict [Widerstreit]i nto something subjective,i n which of course it remains still the same illusion, thati s, as unresolved,a sb efore" (SL 191 / LS 200, emphasis added) .
It has to be admitted, however,t hati nt hese lines Hegel does not himself have in mind the point Ih avej ustb een making.H ei sn ot claiming that,f or Kant,c ontradiction, though absent from the sphere of the "in itself",continues to belong to the world that seems to be real in itself, that is, to transcendental illusion (Schein). His claim is rather that Kant shifts contradiction from things  See also CPR B ,a nd Grier (,  -).
in themselvestothe (in Hegel'sview) "subjective" realm of appearance (Erscheinung). It is for this reason that Hegel thinks Kant does not ultimatelyresolve his antinomies: for Hegel'sKant,contradiction remains even in the world of our empirical experience, the world as it is for us.
That this is Hegel'sview is confirmed by his statement in the Encyclopaedia that,f or Kant, "the worldlycontent,whose determinations are caught in such a contradiction, cannot be something in itself,but onlyappearance [Erscheinung]", and by the subsequent remark that "it is not considered at all objectionable that the world of appearance [die erscheinende Welt]shows contradictions to the spirit thatobserves it" (EL §48 and Remark, translation altered). The interpretation of Kant expressed in these lines is, however,clearlymistaken: for,inK ant'sown view, there is no contradiction in mere appearances. The illusion projected by reason'sidea of the world maywellcontinue to produce contradictions (even if Kant does not saya sm uch himself); but there is no contradiction in thingsa st hey actuallya ppear to us, in the thingsw ee xperience.
ForK ant,ac ontradiction arises when the totality of conditions of appearance is assumedt ob es omething real in itself, because thato ne totality must be understood (for example) both to have and not to have al imit in space and time. Kant then dissolvest his contradiction by rejecting the assumption on which it rests:i nh is view,a ppearances do not constituteareality or world "in itself" and so are neither infinite nor finite "in themselves";t here is thus no contradiction in them (see CPR B5 33).⁴¹ One might still worry,h owever, that,e veni ft hey have no existencei nt hemselves, appearancesf orm ag iven whole for us and that that whole must be both infinite and finite. If thatw ere the case, then the contradiction attached to reason would not actuallyb er emoved but would simply be relocated from the world "in itself" (which has now been exposed as an illusion) to the world of our appearances (which is empiricallyr eal), and Hegel would be right.
Kant insists, however,t hat appearances (and their conditions) not onlyd o not constituteawhole reality or world in itself but also do not constitute a whole worldo rt otality for us. Appearances (and their conditions) are not givena satotality at all,b ecause (as Ih aven oted above) they are giveno nly in the "regressive series of my representations" and that series can never be completed (CPR B533;see alsoB527). As Iregress back from what is actuallygiven to me to other objects of perception, Iregress from one conditioned thing to another,b ut In ever reach ap oint at which no further regression is possible and the whole can thus be said to be given. Accordingly, the series of appearances "is  See also VGP .
Hegel, Kant and the Antinomies of Pure Reason never whollygiven, and the world is thus not an unconditioned whole, and thus does not exist as such aw hole, either with infinite or finite magnitude" (CPR B5 33) . There can be no contradiction in appearances,t herefore, because they do not constituteat otality to which mutuallye xclusive predicatesm ust,o r could even, be applied.
Hegel thus misunderstands Kant when he claims that Kant just shifts contradiction from thingsi nt hemselvesi nto the realm of appearancesa nd thereby leavess uch contradiction "unresolved".F or Kant,there is no fundamental contradiction in the realm of appearance because that realm does not,and cannot, constituteagivent otality to which conflictingp redicates must apply. Nonetheless, as Is uggested above, therei st ruth in Hegel'sc laim thatK ant leavest he contradiction seto ut in the Antinomies unresolved: for thatc ontradiction remains an ineliminable feature of the worldlyt otality there merely seems to be.
3H egel on Kant'sA ntinomies oncea gain
From Hegel'sperspective,Kant alsofalls short insofar as he does not provide the resolution of the antinomies that Hegel thinks is required: Kant fails to focus on the categories that( in Hegel'sv iew) give rise to the antinomies when they are understood in ao ne-sided manner, and he fails to think such one-sided categories in their true, "speculative",unity with one another.A sIhave noted above, what interests Hegel about Kant'santinomies is not principallyKant'sown story about the ideas, transcendental illusion and transcendental realism, but rather what they suggest about the categories of thought, and about the categories in Hegel'ss ense rather than Kant's.
In Kant'so wn view,t he antinomies are indeed related to categories, since they are generated by combiningthe idea of the world with transcendental realism and all ideas of reason in turn are simply "categoriesextended to the unconditioned" (CPR B4 36;s ee alsoB383). More precisely, the ideas are reached by starting from apremise in which acategory of relation is expressed and arguing back, through syllogistic inference, to the point at which the "synthetic unity" thoughtinthat category is regarded as something unconditioned (and /orasencompassingatotality of conditions) (see CPR B383).⁴² The category of substance, for example, is the thought of "something that can exist onlya ss ubject and never as mere predicate",s ot his is extended to the idea of the unconditioned subject ( CPR B2 89, 3 79 ). Thisu nconditioned subject is then identified with  See also Grier (,  -), and Allison (, ). the thinkings ubject( or "I")t op roduce the specific idea of the "soul" (see CPR B391).⁴³ Thecategory of causality,onthe other hand, is based on the thought of the dependence of one thing on another (or the relation of ground and consequent) (CPR B1 06) , so this is extended to the idea of the whole series of such dependencies (see CPR B1 06, 3 79, 3 93) . This totality is then identified with the serieso fc onditions of objects in spacea nd time (that is, of "appearances") to produce the idea of the "world" (see CPR B3 91).⁴⁴ In Hegel'sview,however,Kant'santinomies are just as intimatelyconnected to what he (Hegel) considers to be the categories of infinity and finitude, and they implicitlys uggest thatt hese categoriest hemselvesa re botho pposed to and inseparable from one another and in thats ense contradictory (see VGP 356). Indeed, for Hegel, Kant'sa ntinomies are in truth generated by these and other categories (see EL §48 Remark).⁴⁵ The proper consideration of the antinomies -which Kant fails to carry out -should thus focus on such categories "purelyfor themselves" (rein fürsich)and show how they resolve their owncontradictions logicallya nd thereby develop into their unity translation altered) .
Hegel'sinterpretation of Kant'santinomies clearlydisregards manyofKant's own explicit concerns. In my view,however,itisnot simply unjustified. The connection Hegel drawsb etween Kant'sa ntinomies and certain (Hegelian) categories finds its justification in Kant'sc laim that the antinomies are generated (on the assumption of transcendental realism) by the two ways in which the totality of conditions of appearance can be understood to be unconditioned. As I noted above, thattotality can be understood to be unconditioned as awhole and to have no unconditioned first member, in which caseitisaninfinite totality (in what Hegelw ould consider a "bad" sense); but the totality can also be understood to have an unconditioned first member and so to be limited and finite. Kant makesc lear thatt his distinction, indeedo pposition,b etween an infinite and finite series underlies all four antinomies (see CPR B4 45 -6). Furthermore, each antinomypurports to show that the world in itself must be both infinite and finite, even though the two are mutuallye xclusive.Thus, although Hegeli nterprets Kant'sa ntinomies "against Kant'si ntention" (VGP 356) ,h is claim that they are generated ultimatelyb ycategories is at least partlyj ustified by Kant's own procedure: for (assumingt ranscendental realism) Kant'sa ntinomies arise  See also Grier (, ).  Forafuller account of the formation of the cosmological ideas,see Allison (,  -). Notet hat not all such ideas aret he ideas of series of causes;s ee CPR B  ff.  Such other categories include, for example, discreteness and continuity (in the second antinomy) and necessity and contingency( in the fourth).
because "infinity" and "finitude" provet ob eb oth opposed and inseparable at the samet ime.⁴⁶ It is true that for Kant (in Hegel'sw ords) "reason only falls into contradiction through the application of the categories" to the "world" (EL §48 Remark). Yeti ti st he fact that categories such as infinity and finitude -or continuity and discreteness -are themselvesc onceivedb yK ant as essentially opposed to one another that actuallyg enerates the contradiction when both have to be "applied" to the world. In this sense, Hegel'si nterpretationo f Kant'sa ntinomies is defensible.
Hegel is also justified in claiming thatK ant does not properlyr esolve the contradiction that he (Hegel) sees in Kant'sa ntinomies. As we know,H egel thinks that the contradictions within and between categories, such as infinity and finitude, are resolved -or,rather,resolve themselves -in the course of speculative logic.Thisoccurs as such categoriesprovetobemoments of aunity (see . No aspect of Kant'sr esolution of the antinomies, however, yields this conclusion, so none can satisfy Hegel. Kant resolvest he antinomies to his owns atisfaction by rejectingt ranscendental realism and so denying that appearances and theirconditions form areality in itself that could be either infinite or finite: there is no "real contradiction" between the thesis and antithesis of the antinomies because there is no one reality to which bothm ust apply( see CPR B7 68). From Hegel'sp erspective,h owever,K ant fails thereby to resolve the contradiction between categories such as infinity and finitude in ap roperlys peculative manner.
This remains true even though Hegel is wrongt oc laim that Kant simply moves contradiction from the sphere of thingsi nt hemselvest ot hat of appearance. Viewed from am odified, "Hegelian" perspective (rather thanH egel's own), Kant still fails to provide the resolution that Hegels eeks.H ef ails in two distinct ways.
First,a sw eh aves een, Kant rejects the assumption that the totality of conditionso fa ppearance constitutes ar eality in itself,but he acceptst hat it seems to do so. Furthermore, as Ia rgued above, that seeming reality must continue to be contradictory in Kant'ss ense, even though Kant himself does not explicitly recognize this. Since the world there merelys eems to be retains the same character as the world that is erroneously judgedtoexist,itmust still be either finite or infinite, but must also still be judgedt ob eboth. Thisi nt urn means that for Hegel, the opposed categories of finitude and infinity must still both applyt o Kant'sillusory "world",and so be inseparable in their opposition, and so be contradictory in Hegel'ss ense. Kant,h owever,does not show how these contradic- See Düsing( , ). tory categories can be reconciled and thought together as one,either in relation to that illusory world or (as in Hegel's Logic)inthemselves. Hegel'sassertion that Kant turns the conflict "into something subjective",but otherwise leavesi t" unresolved",isthus justified, even though -pace Hegel -the unresolvedconflict or contradiction attaches not to the realm of appearance (Erscheinung)b ut to the illusion (Schein)p rojected by reason (see SL 191 / LS 200) .
Kant'ss econd failurei sd ifferent.A sj ust noted, no contradictions are to be found in the sphere of appearance, as Kant understands it (since the latter is a not agiven totality that must be, and yetcannot be, both infinite and finite). This conception of appearance as acontradiction-free zone does not,however, resolve the contradiction between the categoriesofinfinity and finitude that Hegel finds expressed in Kant'santinomies. It just removes the contradiction by denying that the categoriesare opposed-but-inseparable (since, in the sphere of appearances, they do not botha pply to the samet otality). Infinity and finitude are thereby simplyl eft distinct from one another within appearance: finite thingsa re, indeed, infinitely divisible, but they are thus "finite" and "infinite" in quite different respects. Now,for Kant,ofcourse, finding away to removeacontradiction is amarkofphilosophical success; for Hegel, however,itistofailtotake seriously the insight implicitlycontainedinthe antinomies. To take the latter seriously, in Hegel'sview,i sn ot to do away with the contradictions within and between categories, but to think those contradictions through to their logical conclusion and speculative resolution. Kant fails to do this because he does not see the need for apurelylogical studyofthe categories in Hegel'ssense (see CPR B108), but also because, for all his strengths, he is ultimatelyap hilosopher of the understanding: in Kant'sv iew,t he point of philosophyi sn ot to go along with, and think through, contradiction but abovea ll to keep thoughta nd reality free of it.
Ih aves uggested that Hegel'sg eneral interpretation and critique of Kant's treatment of the antinomies are justified by certain keya spects of Kant'sp rocedureinthe first Critique. Yetthat interpretation and critique still do not look genuinely immanent,d espite Hegel'ss tatedc ommitment to enteringi mmanently into "the strength [Kraft]o ft he opponent" (SL 581 / LB 10,t ranslation altered). First,H egel focuses, not on what explicitlyc oncerns Kant in the antinomies, but on what he takes to be implicit in Kant'sa ccount of them: namelyt hat categoriesthemselvesgenerate the antinomies. Second, Hegel takes Kant to task for failing to do what Kant had no intention of doing,namelyconsider the categories and theirintrinsic antinomies "purelyfor themselves",asHegel himself does in his speculative logic.
In another sense, however,H egel'sc ritique of Kant on the basiso fh is logic can be considered immanenta fter all. This is because that very logic is made necessary by Kant'so wn demandt hat thought be self-critical and not take the dogmatic assumptions of reason for granted. Dogmatism, Kant tells us, is the "presumption" (Anmaßung)t hatr eason can proceed accordingt op rinciples "without first inquiring in what waya nd by what right it has obtained them" (CPR Bx xxv) . The purpose of critique is thus to challenget hat presumption and to show how -under what conditions -reason'sprinciples can be justified. Hegel, however,a lso sees in this conception of critique ac all to challenget he unquestionedassumptions made by understanding, such as that distinct categories and conceptsl ike "infinity" and "finitude" are, indeed, simply distinct and that thought and the world are governedb yt he principle of contradiction (or, more accurately, non-contradiction) (see SL 41-2/LS 21-2, and EL § §32,8 0). Hegel takes Kant to task, therefore, for failingt oc arry his ownr ejection of dogmatism to its logical conclusion:f or Kant retains the categorial and conceptual distinctions of the understanding "without first inquiring in what waya nd by what right he has obtainedt hem".⁴⁷ In Hegel'se yes, to carry Kant'sr ejection of dogmatism to its logical conclusioni st oc arry out the radicallyp resuppositionless derivation and examination of the categoriest hat is undertaken in the Science of Logic. That in turn includes ac lose studyo ft hose categories -such as infinity and finitude, condition and the unconditioned, and discreteness and continuity -that explicitlyorimplicitly "constitutethe essence and ground of the antinomies" (SL 191 / LS 199) .Hegel'sapparently "external" consideration of Kant'sa ntinomies is thus in fact guided by al ogic that is the direct resulto f following Kant'so wn injunction to reject dogmatism (as well as the indirect result of those antinomies themselves, as In oted above).
Hegel certainlydoes not do justicetoKant'saccount of the antinomies in the wayt hat Kantians maye xpect.N onetheless, he offers ac ritique of Kant'sa ccount (as well as of his transcendental idealism) that is ultimatelyd rivenb y one of Kant'so wn philosophical imperatives: anti-dogmatism. Hegel interprets Kant'santinomies as imperfect anticipations of his own insight into the presuppositionless,immanent dialectic within thought through which contradictions in and between categories arise and are then resolved. From Hegel'spoint of view, however,( as Gueroultp uts it) "pressingt he Kantian system is enough to let Hegelian dialectic emerge from it as if by itself".⁴⁸  See Houlgate( , ).  Gueroult( , ): "Es genügt,das Kantische System zu pressen, um wie vons elbst die Hegelsche Dialektik ausihm hervortretenzulassen" (emphasis added to translation). Gueroult's remark that Hegel'st houghtd raws moreo na n" hegelianised Kant" than on Kant himself suggests that he is actuallysceptical of Hegel'sclaim to be takingKantian thought to its logicalconclusion. In my view,bycontrast,i nt he respect Ih aveo utlined (though admittedlyn ot in every respect) Hegeli sr ight.
